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S U M M A R Y
Background: Serratia marcescens is an important nosocomial pathogen causing signiﬁcant outbreaks.
Here we report an outbreak of bloodstream infection caused by S. marcescens at a 3500-bed hospital in
Taiwan. The effective cooperative efforts of both laboratory personnel and infection control practitioners
(ICPs) jointly contributed to the total control of the outbreak.
Methods: A sudden increase in the isolation of S. marcescens from blood cultures was noted in the Clinical
Microbiology Laboratory. The information was passed to the ICPs and an investigation was initiated.
Pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis was used to study the relationships among the isolates.
Results: Pulsotype A was identiﬁed in 43 (82.7%) of the 52 blood isolates studied. They were isolated
from 52 patients distributed across 22 wards that were surveyed by seven ICPs. All patients had
undergone surgery before the infection, and fentanyl-containing intravenous ﬂuids were used for pain
control in 43 of them. Isolates from 42 belonged to pulsotype A. Three S. marcescens isolates, all from
fentanyl-containing ﬂuids and demonstrating pulsotype A, were identiﬁed from 251 environmental
cultures. All fentanyl-containing ﬂuids that were in use were withdrawn and the outbreak was stopped.
Conclusions: The outbreak of S. marcescens bloodstream infection apparently occurred through the use of
fentanyl-containing ﬂuids contaminated by a pulsotype A S. marcescens.
 2013 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Serratia marcescens is a Gram-negative bacillus belonging to the
family Enterobacteriaceae. Its role in human infection was ﬁrst
noted in 1913.1 However, the organism did not attract much
attention until the ﬁrst outbreak of nosocomial infections was
reported in 1951.2 S. marcescens is now recognized as a prominent
opportunistic pathogen associated with signiﬁcant outbreaks of
various healthcare-associated infections (HAIs), including bacter-
emia, central nervous system infection, pneumonia, and urinary
tract infection.3–15 Sources of the infection may include contami-
nated equipment,3 injected medications or ﬂuids,4–13 and cleans-
ers/disinfectants.14
Outbreaks of HAIs are usually identiﬁed by hospital infection
control practitioners (ICPs) through the established surveillance* Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 3 3281200 ext. 8363; fax: +886 3 3971827.
E-mail addresses: sulh@adm.cgmh.org.tw, sulinhui@gmail.com (L.-H. Su).
1 These authors contributed equally to this work.
1201-9712/$36.00 – see front matter  2013 International Society for Infectious Disea
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2013.02.012system. A signiﬁcant increase in the number of HAI cases caused by
certain microorganisms in a deﬁned hospital area usually indicates
the possibility of an existing outbreak. In order to fulﬁll the
workload of total infection control management, an optimal
stafﬁng of at least one ICP per 250 beds has been recommended
and used in the USA and many international healthcare facilities
since 1985. Hence, for larger hospitals, several ICPs would be
equipped to form an infection control team and serve the duty of
hospital-wide infection control. Consequently, each ICP may be
assigned to certain departments and may become more familiar
with the situations in the area under his/her responsibility than
other areas. Therefore, weekly or at least monthly team meetings
to report and discuss the situation in their areas are necessary so
that every ICP updates their understanding of the HAI situation in
the hospital as a whole. However, if an outbreak of HAIs is caused
by factors across multiple departments that are covered by several
ICPs, the outbreak may not be discovered until the affected areas or
patient numbers exceed a certain amount, or may even become a
hospital-wide epidemic.15ses. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 1. Epidemic curve of the outbreak of bloodstream infection caused by
Serratia marcescens. Each cell represents a case with the infection. Blank cells are
cases with surgery and the use of fentanyl-containing pain control ﬂuids. Cells with
vertical lines are cases with surgery but without the use of the pain control ﬂuids.
Cells with small squares are cases with neither surgery nor the use of the pain
control ﬂuids. Pulsotypes of the isolates are indicated as A to H.
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infection (BSI) caused by S. marcescens at a 3500-bed university
hospital in Taiwan. The majority of the patients had undergone
various surgical procedures in which fentanyl-containing
intravenous ﬂuids were used for postsurgical pain control
management, prior to the development of the S. marcescens BSI.
The patients were widely distributed across 22 wards, and a
total of seven ICPs were responsible for the routine surveillance
of these areas. The supervisor of the Clinical Microbiology
Laboratory in the hospital raised the alert due to an unusual
increase in S. marcescens blood isolates, and the investigation
was started. The effective cooperative efforts of both laboratory
and clinical personnel jointly contributed to the total control of
the outbreak.
2. Methods
2.1. Setting
Chang Gung Memorial Hospital (CGMH) is a 3500-bed
university-afﬁliated medical center located in northern Taiwan.
The hospital serves patients with different clinical needs and
consists of 13 disease-orientated departments, including 26
intensive care units (ICUs) and 73 ordinary wards. For patients
with surgical needs, the hospital is also equipped with a surgical
center with 68 operating theatres. The Clinical Microbiology
Laboratory in the Department of Laboratory Medicine provides
routine services for the isolation/identiﬁcation and antimicrobial
susceptibility testing of microbiological pathogens for the whole
hospital.
Active hospital-wide surveillance for HAIs has been conducted
by ICPs of the infection control team at CGMH since 1976.16 From
1995, a case of HAI was deﬁned according to the updated criteria
suggested by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).17 The infection control team consisted of 14 ICPs. Each ICP
was responsible for the HAI surveillance in different departments
or ward units.
2.2. Epidemiological investigation
A healthcare-associated BSI was deﬁned in a patient with blood
cultures positive for a microorganism that was obtained more than
48 h after being admitted to the hospital. In the present study, to
assess the potential risk factors, the medical records of patients
with S. marcescens BSI were reviewed and compared, including
demographic characteristics, underlying diseases, recent surgery,
and the associated medications. Evaluation of the practices in the
associated operating theatres was performed. To identify the
possible reservoirs, environmental cultures were conducted in the
surgical center and its pharmacy unit. In accordance with the
antibiogram of the S. marcescens isolates, 32 mg/ml of cefuroxime
was added to the culture media to improve the efﬁciency of
isolation.
2.3. Microbiological examination
All clinical isolates of S. marcescens were cultured and
identiﬁed by standard methods.18 Antimicrobial susceptibility
was tested by a standard disk diffusion method.19 Susceptible
and resistant isolates were deﬁned according to the criteria
suggested by the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute.19
To determine the relationships among S. marcescens isolates,
molecular typing by pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis (PFGE)
was performed using the method described previously.20 The
criteria suggested by Tenover et al. were used to analyze the
results.212.4. Statistical analysis
Epi Info software (version 6.04, CDC, Stone Mountain, GA, USA)
was used for the statistical analysis. The Chi-square test or Fisher’s
exact test, when appropriate, was used. A difference was
considered statistically signiﬁcant with a two-tailed p-value of
less than 0.05.
3. Results
3.1. Epidemiological investigation
During the last week of October 2003, the supervisor of the
Clinical Microbiology Laboratory noticed that the incidence of S.
marcescens identiﬁed from routine blood cultures had increased
dramatically from less than one isolate per week to several isolates
per day (Figure 1). The majority of the isolates were resistant to
ampicillin/cefazolin/cefuroxime and susceptible to the other
antimicrobial agents. This unusual event was immediately
communicated to the ICPs. An initial investigation revealed that
the patients were distributed across 22 different wards that were
surveyed by seven ICPs. At the same time, the 52 blood isolates of S.
marcescens identiﬁed during October and November 2003 were
analyzed by PFGE. A predominant pattern, named pulsotype A, was
identiﬁed in 43 (82.7%) of the isolates. The emergence of the
pulsotype A isolates also coincided with the upsurge in S.
marcescens infections (Figure 1).
A comparison of clinical features between patients infected
with the pulsotype A strain and the patients with other pulsotypes
was performed by the ICPs (Table 1). No signiﬁcant difference was
found regarding the demographic characteristics or underlying
diseases. Recent surgery and the associated medications, such as
intravenous ﬂuids (0.9% saline) and preventive antibiotics
(cefazolin), were signiﬁcantly associated with the pulsotype A
infection (p < 0.000005). The use of fentanyl for pain control after
surgery was also signiﬁcantly associated with the pulsotype A
group (p < 0.000005).
Table 1
Comparison of clinical features between patients with Serratia marcescens bloodstream infections caused by the pulsotype A strain and strains of other pulsotypes
Characteristic Mean  SD (range), or number (%) of patients p-Valuea Odds ratio (95% CI)
Pulsotype A
(n = 43)
Other pulsotypes
(n = 9)
Male sex 22 (51.2%) 6 (66.7%) NS 0.52 (0.09–2.83)
Age (years) 51.3  15.1 (17–80) 58.1  13.8 (35–76) NS N/A
Underlying disease
Burn 2 (4.7%) 0 (0%) NS N/A
Diabetes mellitus 2 (4.7%) 1 (11.1%) NS 0.39 (0.02–12.35)
Liver cirrhosis 0 (0%) 1 (11.1%) NS 0.00 (0.00–3.66)
Malignancy 3 (7.0%) 5 (55.6%) <0.005 0.06 (0.01–0.45)
Stone 1 (2.3%) 0 (0%) NS N/A
Trauma 10 (23.3%) 0 (0%) NS N/A
None 25 (58.1%) 2 (22.2%) NS 4.86 (0.77–38.74)
Recent surgery
Cardiovascular 3 (7.0%) 0 (0%) NS N/A
Central nervous system 0 (0%) 1 (11.1%) NS 0.00 (0.00–3.66)
Chest 3 (7.0%) 0 (0%) NS N/A
General 2 (4.7%) 2 (22.2%) NS 0.17 (0.01–2.09)
Orthopedic 25 (58.1%) 0 (0%) <0.005 N/A
Plastic 8 (18.6%) 0 (0%) NS N/A
Urogenital 2 (4.7%) 0 (0%) NS N/A
Any 43 (100.0%) 3 (33.3%) <0.000005 N/A
Intravenous ﬂuids/medication
Saline, 0.9% 43 (100.0%) 3 (33.3%) <0.000005 N/A
Cefazolin 43 (100.0%) 3 (33.3%) <0.000005 N/A
Fentanyl 42 (97.7%) 1 (11.1%) <0.0000005 336.0 (14.47–48651.47)
Antibiogram
Resistant to ampicillin, cefazolin, and cefuroxime 43 (100.0%) 3 (33.3%) <0.000005 N/A
SD, standard deviation; CI, conﬁdence interval; NS, not statistically signiﬁcant; N/A, not applicable.
a The Chi-square test (or Fisher’s exact test, when appropriate) and two-tailed Student’s t-test were used for statistical analysis of the difference. A difference was
considered statistically signiﬁcant with p < 0.05.
P.-C. Chiang et al. / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 17 (2013) e718–e722e720All 43 patients infected with the pulsotype A strain had
undergone various surgical procedures 1 to 6 days prior to the
infection. All the signiﬁcant factors (use of intravenous ﬂuids,
fentanyl-containing pain control ﬂuids, and preventive antibiotics)
were also associated with the surgery. The surgical center was
therefore suspected to be the major source of the infection. Further
investigations revealed that the surgical procedures were per-
formed in different operating theatres by different surgeons and
nurses. However, an on-site inspection of the associated operating
theatres and procedures could not identify any lapse in the
associated sterile/aseptic techniques.
3.2. Environmental culture of the surgical center
To identify the possible reservoirs, environmental cultures were
conducted in the surgical center. A total of 251 specimens were
collected, including various intravenous ﬂuids containing fentanyl
(six unopened and 39 left-over after use) or others (seven
unopened and 18 left-over after use), detergents/antiseptics (four
unopened and 160 in use), surface swabs of surgical instruments
and any other suspected objects (n = 17).
Despite this effort, only three isolates of S. marcescens were
identiﬁed. They were recovered from three bags of left-over
intravenous ﬂuids that contained fentanyl for pain control. Only
one of the patients who used these ﬂuids was retrievable; he had a
fever after surgery and had been empirically prescribed gentami-
cin without any bacterial culture. PFGE analysis indicated that the
three isolates also belonged to the pulsotype A observed in the
majority of the clinical isolates from patients.
After ﬁnding that the contaminated fentanyl-containing
intravenous ﬂuids might be the reservoir of the outbreak, an on-
site inspection was conducted in the pharmacy unit where the pain
control ﬂuids were prepared in the surgical center. Standard
operation procedures were executed by the personnel and all
fulﬁlled the infection control policies. To identify the source of the
contamination, a second environmental culture was performed inthe pharmacy unit. A total of 112 specimens were collected,
including hand cultures of the pharmacy personnel (n = 7), swabs
of the associated environment surfaces (n = 11), detergents/
antiseptics (n = 4), empty vials of narcotic agents, including
fentanyl (n = 65), and others (n = 25). Only one isolate of S.
marcescens was recovered from the surface of a tap in the
preparation room. PFGE analysis indicated that the strain was not
pulsotype A and thus may not be related to the outbreak.
Reinforcement of infection control policies and re-education of
the pharmacy personnel regarding hand-washing, aseptic prepa-
ration, and environmental cleansing, were conducted. Weekly
surveillance cultures of intravenous medication prepared in-house
were performed continuously to monitor the sterility of the
products. No further contamination by S. marcescens or other
bacteria has been identiﬁed since the outbreak.
3.3. Termination of the outbreak
Immediately after the identiﬁcation of the S. marcescens in the
left-over fentanyl-containing ﬂuids, the superior authorities of the
hospital immediately decided to withdraw all of the in-use
fentanyl-containing ﬂuids to prevent any further infection. Also, to
prevent any possible misuse, the withdrawn ﬂuids were destroyed
on site immediately. None of the removed ﬂuids was available for
further examination. The outbreak subsided very quickly without
any mortality (Figure 1). Only sporadic isolates of S. marcescens
with different pulsotypes were identiﬁed from the blood cultures
(Figure 1). During the 9-year period after the outbreak, up to the
present, no similar outbreak of infection has occurred at this
hospital.
4. Discussion
Outbreaks of healthcare-associated bloodstream infections
associated with extrinsic contamination of narcotic agents have
been described in many previous reports.5–8,22–25 Interestingly, S.
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events.5–8 In the present study, S. marcescens was also isolated
from some fentanyl-containing ﬂuids and was genetically indis-
tinguishable from the outbreak strain isolated from the majority of
the patients, indicating that the outbreak was associated with the
contaminated fentanyl-containing ﬂuids.
Previous reports have indicated some of the possible causes that
may be related to such contaminations, including lapses in the
aseptic technique, use of single-use medication vials on multiple
patients, use of a common syringe for multiple medications/
patients, and even illicit use by healthcare personnel.4–8,22–25
However, despite the efforts to reveal the possible route of
contamination, none of these conditions could be found in the
present study. As S. marcescens was found in only three of the left-
over fentanyl-containing ﬂuids, the contamination might have been
introduced accidentally during the preparation procedure. The
problem might also have been overcome by education and
continuous monitoring during the investigation and thereafter.
Consequently, after the complete withdrawal of all the in-use
fentanyl-containing ﬂuids, no similar infection cases were reported.
Although only three contaminated fentanyl-containing ﬂuids
were identiﬁed, one patient was traceable and was found to have
developed fever after surgery. The patient had recovered with
empirical antibiotics without any culture evidence. Similar
situations have been reported previously; patients who received
contaminated ﬂuids may not have developed illnesses and
therefore remained unaware before any investigation was
started.22,23 This situation implies that the outbreak may have
involved more patients than we identiﬁed. Moreover, the hidden
patients may have deterred or delayed the investigation until more
patients were affected and the outbreak became more obvious.
Positive bacterial culture results are usually used by ICPs to screen
for the existence of HAI cases. However, manual surveillance is not
only time-consuming but may also miss some HAI cases, such as
the one we identiﬁed herein. Recently, an automated detection
system incorporating data from multiple sources, including
microbiology and other laboratory results, as well as medication
data, was developed to predict drain-related meningitis.26 A
similar design may also be feasible in detecting the hidden cases
who develop postsurgery infections and are given empirical
antimicrobial agents without any microbiological evidence.
It is disappointing that no further contaminated fentanyl-
containing ﬂuids could be identiﬁed. However, it is generally
accepted that outbreak investigations should ﬁrst solve the
problem to prevent any further risk to patients. The immediate
withdrawal of all the in-use fentanyl-containing ﬂuids was a must
once the possible source of contamination was revealed. To
prevent any misuse, all the withdrawn bags were also destroyed
immediately and therefore no further evidence could be retrieved.
Judging from the fact that no new cases were identiﬁed, the
immediate act of withdrawal and destroying of the ﬂuids deﬁnitely
played an important role in stopping the outbreak.
It has long been recognized that the microbiology laboratory
has the earliest opportunity to detect the emergence or clusters of
speciﬁc organisms or antimicrobial resistance patterns, as a result
of continuous monitoring and analysis of the extensive data
accumulated from routine cultures. With the close communication
with ICPs, laboratory personnel can therefore help to detect and
eliminate potential outbreaks of HAIs.27–29 The present report is
another good example, demonstrating how microbiology labora-
tory personnel can assist in infection control. Because the infected
patients were distributed across 22 different wards that were
surveyed by seven ICPs, the sudden increase in S. marcescens
infections would not have been so obvious to each of the seven ICPs
in the initial stages. The excellent professional awareness of the
Clinical Microbiology Laboratory personnel, as well as the goodcommunication between the laboratory and the ICPs jointly
contributed to the early detection of this unusual outbreak, leading
to an efﬁcient investigation and prompt termination of the
outbreak. Recently, several computer-assisted surveillance sys-
tems using microbiology data to detect potential outbreaks of HAIs
have been reported.30,31 Integration of such information technolo-
gy should further extend the value of microbiology data and
contribute more efﬁciently to hospital-wide infection control and
outbreak detection.
In conclusion, an unusual and overwhelming outbreak of S.
marcescens BSIs was reported. Contamination of fentanyl-contain-
ing ﬂuids was found to be associated with the outbreak.
Continuous education on infection control policies and monitoring
of the aseptic preparation procedures are necessary for personnel
responsible for the preparation of intravenous ﬂuids with or
without other medications. Until the implementation of any
automated detection systems, close communication among ICPs,
as well as between ICPs and laboratory personnel, is important for
the rapid identiﬁcation and termination of such outbreaks.
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